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Self-Defense and Rights1 
Judith Jarvis Thomson 
I. Suppose Aggressor has got hold of a tank. He had told 
Victim that if he gets a tank, he's going to get in it and run Victim 
down. Victim sees Aggressor get in his tank and start towards 
Victim. It is open country, and Victim can see that there is no 
place to hide, and nothing he can put between himself and Aggres-
sor which Aggressor cannot circle round. Fortunately, Victim hap· 
pens to have an anti-tank gun with him, and it is in good working 
order, so he can use it to blow up the tank, thereby saving his life, 
but of course thereby also killing Aggressor. I think that most 
people would say that it is morally permissible for Victim to use 
that anti-tank gun: surely it is permissible to kill a man if that is 
the only way in which you can prevent him from killing you! 
On the other hand, one of the things we arc firmly wedded to 
is the belie£ that human beings have a right to life, and this pre-
sumably includes the right to not be killed. Aggressor is a human 
being; so he, like the rest of us, has a right to life, and presumably, 
therefore, the right to not be killed. So how can Victim kill him? 
Precisely why is it permissible for Victim to use that anti-tank gun 
on Aggressor? I propose we look at three replies which I think 
come fairly readily to mind. 
2. The first reply I am going to call "forfeit," and it goes like 
this. "We good folk all do have a right to life, and that does include 
the right to not be killed. But there is such a thing as forfeiting a 
right. We say such things as that the right to life, liberty, and the 
pursuit of happiness are 'natural rights,' and therefore uncondi-
tionally possessed by all people; but that is just so much high· 
minded rhetoric. What has happened in the case described is that 
Aggressor, by virtue of his attack on Victim, has forfeited his right 
to not be killed, and therefore his right to life. And that is why 
Victim may use his anti-tank gun on Aggressor, thereby killing 
him: he violates no right of Aggressor's in doing so." 
But the fact is that this very natural first reply is not at all 
satisfactory. Suppose that as Victim raises his anti-tank gun to fire 
1 I am indebted to the students and faculty of the Department of Philosophy 
at the University of Kansas, and to the members of the Society for Ethical and 
Legal Philosophy, for criticisms of earlier versions of the following paper. 
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it, Aggressor's tank stalls. Aggressor gets out to examine the engine, 
but falls and breaks both ankles in the process. Victim (let us sup-
pose) now has time to get away from Aggressor, and is in no danger. 
I take it you will not think that Victim may all the same go ahead 
and kill Aggressor. But why not?-i£ Aggressor really has forfeited 
his right to not be killed by virtue of his attack on Victim.2 
It could, of course, be said that at this point utilitarian con-
siderations come into play. I.e., it could be said that yes, Aggressor 
has forfeited his right to life, but no, Victim cannot now kill him, 
and that this latter is true because Victim now has no need to kill 
Aggressor-indeed, because killing Aggressor would mean the loss 
of a life, whereas not killing Aggressor would mean no loss at all. 
But I think this cannot be right. Suppose Victim is a great 
transplant surgeon. There is Aggressor, lying helpless next to his 
tank, with two broken ankles-but the rest of him physically fine 
and healthy. Can Victim now cart Aggressor off to surgery, cut him 
up, and give his one heart, two kidneys, and two lungs to five who 
need the parts? If Aggressor now has no right to not be killed 
(having forfeited it by his attack on Victim), so that utilitarian 
considerations are all we have to weigh here, it is hard to see why 
noL After all, five lives would be saved at a cost of only one. Yet 
surely Victim cannot do this. 
I am inclined to think that it would no more be permissible for 
Victim to cut Aggressor up and parcel out his parts to save five than 
it would be for Victim to cut you up and parcel out your parts to 
save five. He cannot do this to you; and it is often said that the 
reason why he cannot (despite the fact that utilities might be 
maximized by doing so) is the fact that you have a right to life, and 
thus, presumably, the right to not be killed.a I should imagine that 
the very same thing makes it impermissible for Victim to do this to 
Aggressor, viz., the fact that Aggressor, now helpless and no danger 
to anyone, has a right to life, and thus, presumably, the right to 
not be killed. 
There are, of course, those who think it permissible for a state to 
impose death, as a penalty, on one who commits one or another 
very serious crime. If any one of them is a friend of the reply I am 
2 This question is asked by Sanford H. Kadish, in "Respect for Life and 
Regard for Rights in the Criminal Law," forthcoming. (In fact, this paper 
was caused by that one.) 
• But it is not at all obvious that this is what explains the fact that Victim 
cannot cut you up and parcel out your parts to save five. Cf. footnote 7 below. 
calling "forfeit," he will no doubt say that what makes it permissi-
ble is the fact that one who commits such a crime has forfeited his 
right to not be killed. But in the first place, I doubt that those who 
think of death as an acceptable penalty would think it an acceptable 
penalty for an (unsuccessful) attempt on the life of another, and it 
will be remembered that an (unsuccessful) attempt is all that Ag-
gressor is guilty of. More important, even if it could be made out that 
it will be permissible, after trial and conviction, for an agent of the 
state to kill Aggressor, no agent of the state can kill him now (prior 
to trial and conviction). And Victim not only cannot kill him now, 
Victim-unless he is himself an agent of the state-is not going to 
be able to kill him at any time. So while it is (I suppose) open to 
those who regard death as an acceptable penalty for Aggressor's 
crime to say that he will (after trial and conviction) have no right 
to not be killed by an agent of the state, he at any rate now has a 
right to not be killed by Victim, indeed a right to not be killed by 
anybody at all, and thus a right to not be killed. 
There are two moves open to a friend of 'forfeit.' He can say 
(I) that the fact that the tank stalled and Aggressor broke both 
ankles shows that it never was necessary for Victim to kill Aggressor, 
so that Aggressor never did forfeit his right to not be killed. Or he 
can say (2) that Aggressor did forfeit his right to not be killed when 
he launched his attack on Victim, but that he regained this right at 
the moment at which he ceased to pose a threat to Victim's life. 
(I) would be an unfortunate choice for the purpose of 'forfeit.' 
For surely Victim could, permissibly, have killed Aggressor at any 
time between the launching of Aggressor's attack and the stall of 
the tank. (Who in such circumstances could be expected to know 
that the tank would stall? Who in such circumstances could be 
expected to wait in hopes of so freakish an accident?) That indeed 
was where we began: i.e., with the fact that it was then permissible 
for Victim to shoot. 'Forfeit' proposed to explain this fact by saying 
that Aggressor forfeited a right; yet (I) denies that he did. 
(2) seems preferable for the purposes of this reply. If Aggressor 
did forfeit his right to not be killed when he launched the attack, 
that would explain why, between the launching of it and the stall 
of the tank, Victim could shoot; and if Aggressor re-acquired that 
right when he ceased to pose a threat to Victim, that would explain 
why, after the stall of the tank, Victim could no longer shoot. 
But it is a far from happy choice. If it were by virtue just of the 
launching of that attack that Aggressor forfeited his right, then it 
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would seem possible to say that when the attack ceases, Aggressor 
re-acquires his right-the right being, as it were, in abeyance 
throughout the time of the attack. But it surely cannot be said to 
have been by virtue just of the launching of that attack that Aggres-
sor forfeited his right. Compare a second aggressor and a second 
victim. Suppose that Second Aggressor launches a similar attack on 
Second Victim, but that Second Aggressor (by contrast with Ag-
gressor) is innocent: Second Aggressor, let us suppose, is a schizo-
phrenic, and he is under a hallucination that Second Victim is in a 
tank of his own, driving towards Second Aggressor's home and 
family, so that, as Second Aggressor sees it, he is merely trying to 
ward off an attack. Morality may not protect us from getting run 
down by lunatics in tanks, but it does permit our protecting our-
selves from such a fate; and it seems plain that poor Second Victim, 
who is himself innocent, may permissibly use his anti-tank gun on 
Second Aggressor. Why is this permissible? It is an excellent ques-
tion. But presumably 'forfeit' would be a most implausible reply in 
this case.4 Perhaps Aggressor, being a villain, can be thought to 
have forfeited a right; Second Aggressor, however, being himself 
innocent, cannot. But then it is not by virtue just of launching an 
attack on Victim that Aggressor forfeits his right; Aggressor's bad 
intention figures too. Yet Aggressor's bad intention may be sup-
posed to remain, even after he becomes helpless-we may imagine 
him continuing to plot as he is carried off to jail-and if that re-
mains, how can he be thought to have re-acquired the right he 
forfeited at least in part because of that bad intention? 
There is room for maneuver here. It could be said that the point 
is this: both Aggressor and Second Aggressor simply cease to have 
a right to not be killed when they launch their attacks on their 
victims, and both of them re-acquire that right when their tanks 
stall. (On this view, while Aggressor is guilty and Second Aggres-
sor is not, this does not matter: launching an attack by itself-
whether guilty or not-is what makes one lose the right to not be 
killed.) I shall come back to this idea later. For the moment, it 
should be noted that saying that Aggressor simply ceased to have 
the right is not the same as saying that Aggressor has forfeited the 
right. That is, this reply is entailed by the reply I am calling 
"forfeit," but is not identical with it. 
3. The second reply I am going to call "specification." In fact, 
'Cf. again Kadish, op. cit. 
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I mean to use the term "specification" so as to cover two connected 
replies. Both begin in the same way. "You only think there's a 
problem here because you think that 'Aggressor has a right to life' 
entails 'Aggressor has a right to not be killed.' But it doesn't. We 
all do have a right to life, but that right to life is a more complicated 
business than it at first may appear to be. In particular, having a 
right to life doesn't include having a right to not be killed. Indeed, 
nobody has a right to not be killed: all you have is-" and here 
there are two ways in which the speaker may go on. I will call the 
first "moral specification": " ... all you have is the right to not be 
wrongly, unjustly killed." I will call the second "factual specifica-
tion": " ... all you have is the right to not be killed if you are not 
in process of trying to kill a person, where that person has every 
reason to believe he can preserve his life only by killing you.'' There 
is what seems to me a serious objection, which bears against both 
of these equally. But first let us look at difficulties specific to each. 
I used to think that the reply I have called "moral specification" 
was the right reply to make in the case I described, as in other, 
similar, cases. That is, I used to think it just a mistake to suppose 
that anyone has a right to not be killed. It is so obvious that there 
are cases in which it is permissible, and therefore no violation of 
anyone's rights, to kill a person that it seems right to say that the 
most we can plausibly be thought to have is a right to not be wrongly 
or unjustly killed. But if so, then it is hard to see how appeal to 
rights which we do or do not have can expl/llin why it is or is not 
permissible for a person to kill. Consider Victim. We were asked to 
explain why it is permissible for Victim to use his anti-tank gun on 
Aggressor, thereby killing him; and consider the following answer: 
"The reason why it is permissible for Victim to kill Aggressor is that 
Aggressor has no right to not be killed-he only has a right to not 
be killed wrongly or unjustly-and in killing Aggressor, Victim 
would not be killing Aggressor wrongly or unjustly.'' One does not 
mind all circles, but this circle is too small. For it to be permissible 
for Victim to kill Aggressor is Cor it to be the case that in killing 
Aggressor, Victim does not act wrongly or unjustly: and we cannot 
say that the reason why Victim is not acting wrongly or unjustly in 
killing Aggressor is the fact that in killing Aggressor, Victim is 
not acting wrongly or unjustly. 
The reply I have called "factual specification" is, I think, even 
less satisfactory. Let us look at it again. "Nobody has a right to not 
be killed: all you have is a right to not be killed if you are not in 
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process of trying to kill a person, where that person has every reason 
to belive he can preserve his life only by killing you." Hence Victim 
can kill Aggressor. For Victim violates no right of Aggressor's in 
killing him, for Aggressor is in process of trying to kill Victim, 
where Victim has every reason to believe he can preserve his life 
only by killing Aggressor. 
But the fact is that there are a great many other cases in which 
it is permissible to kill a man-defense of your life against a villain 
is by no means the only one. Consider Second Aggressor again. 
Second Aggressor is no villain; yet Second Victim can shoot to kill. 
Again, consider a case which involves what Robert Nozick calls 
an "innocent shield of a threat."G Third Aggressor is driving his 
tank at you. But he has taken care to arrange that a baby is strapped 
to the front of the tank, so that if you use your anti-tank gun, you 
will not only kill Third Aggressor, you will kill the baby. Now 
Third Aggressor, admittedly, is in process of trying to kill you; but 
that baby isn't. Yet you can presumably go ahead and use the gun, 
even though this involves killing the baby as well as Third 
Aggressor. 
It would, of course, be consistent to opt for 'factual specification' 
in the original case of Aggressor and Victim, and yet not opt for a 
similar reply in these other cases. Yet it is hard to see what reason 
there could be for distinguishing. And if a similar reply is opted 
for in these other cases, we shall find ourselves having to say, not 
only that nobody has a right to not be killed, but also that you do 
not even. have a right to not be killed if you are not in process of 
trying to kill a person, where that person has every reason to believe 
he can preserve his life only by killing you. We shall find our-
selves having to say that the most you have is a right to not be 
killed if (a) you are not a villain who is trying to kill a person, 
and (b) you are not a schizophrenic who is trying to (as he sees it) 
ward off an attack on his home and family, and (c) you are not 
tied to a tank which will kill a person-where the threatened per-
son in (a), (b), and (c) has every reason to believe he can preserve 
his life only by killing you. 
And this is obviously not the end of it. Consider a case of a 
quite different kind, which I borrow from Philippa Foot.& You are 
GCf. his Ar~nrclly, State, a11d Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974), p. !J5. 
e Cf. Iter "Abortion and the Doctrine of the Double Effect,'' Oxford Review 
5 (1967). 
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the driver of a trolley. On the track ahead of you are five track 
workmen. The banks are very steep at that point, and they are 
not able to get off the track. Well, it is plain enough: you had 
better put on your brakes. Alas, the brakes do not work. You 
notice just then that there is a spur of track leading off to the right, 
and your wheel works so that you can turn off onto it. But again 
alas, you can see that there is one track workman on the track on 
the right, and he too cannot get off the track. So you can do nothing, 
in which case you kill five; or you can turn off to the right, in which 
case you kill one. Presumably it is morally permissible-some would 
even say it was morally required-that you turn the trolley off to 
the right, thereby killing one. But why is it permissible to kill that 
one? Does he not have a right to life?T Notice that he is not 
threatening anybody at all; nor is he an innocent shield of a threat. 
A friend of 'factual specification' will then presumably have to 
expand still further his list of conditions under which killing is 
permissible, and thus make still more complicated the right which 
-as he says-is the most we have in respect of life. 
Where is this to end? Is there anybody who knows what right 
it is which (it is here suggested) is the most we have in respect of 
life? 
Moreover, it is worth noticing that a kind of circle is going to 
turn up here too. What the friend of 'factual specification' has to 
do is to figure out when it is permissible to kill, and then tailor, 
accordingly, his account of what right it is which is the most we 
have in respect of life. But if that is the only way anyone can have 
of finding out what right it is we have in respect of life, how can 
anyone then explain its being permissible to kill in such and such 
circumstances by appeal to the fact that killing in those circum-
stances does not violate the right which is the most the victim has 
in respect of life? 
But I think there· is a still more serious objection, which bears 
equally against both 'moral specification' and 'factual specification.' 
What I have in mind is that both replies issue from what I think 
Y If the workman on the right· hand track has a right to life (and It seems 
plain that if we do, he does), then we cannot explain the fact that a surgeon 
cannot cut you up and parcel out your parts to save five by appeal to the fact 
that you have a right to life. For so does the workman; yet the driver can turn 
the trolley onto him to sa\'c five. Mrs. Foot (op. cit.) has an explanation; another 
may be found in J. J. Thomson, "Killing, Letting Die, and the Trolley Problem," 
The Monist 59 (1976). 
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is an incorrect view of rights: neither would be opted for by any-
one who did not take the view that rights are, in a certain sense, 
absolute. What this sense is may best be brought out if we make 
a terminological distinction. Suppose a man has a right that some-
thing or other shall be the case; let us say he has a right that p. 
where p is some statement or other. And now suppose that we make 
p false. So, for example, if his right is the right that he is not 
punched in the nose, we make that false, i.e., we bring about that he 
is punched in the nose. Then, as I shall say, we infringe his right. 
But I shall say that we violate his right if and only if we do not 
merely infringe his right, but more, are acting wrongly, unjustly 
in doing so. Now the view that rights are 'absolute' in the sense 
I have in mind is the view that every infringing of a right is a 
violating of a right. 
This view of rights seems to me, as I said, to be incorrect. That 
it is comes out in the following case. You are rich, and therefore 
own lots of steak, which you keep in a locked freezer on your back 
porch. Here is a child with a terrible protein deficiency: he will die 
if I do not get some protein into him fast. I have none myself at the 
moment. I call you to see if you will lend or sell me a steak, but 
your answering service says you are out of town for the weekend, 
and they do not know where. The only way in which I can get 
some protein for that child is to break into your freezer and take a 
steak. Now most people would say it is okay, I can go ahead. But 
why? Don't you have a right that people will not break into your 
freezer and take a steak? If anyone thinks that rights are 'absolute,' 
then he is committed to saying that you do not after all have a right 
that people will not break into your freezer and take a steak, and 
this on the ground that I do not act wrongly or unjustly if I do 
so-and I surely do not act wrongly or unjustly if I do so, since it is 
permissible for me to do so. This is not to say he has to deny you 
have any rights over your freezer and your steak. We are all familiar 
by now with the kind of right he can say you have. He can engage 
in moral specification: he can say that although you do not have a 
right that people will not break into your freezer and take a steak, 
you do have a right that people will not do this wrongly or un-
justly. Or, alternatively, he can engage in factual specification: he 
can say that the right you do have is that people will not do this 
except where they have in hand a chiJd with a protein deficiency, 
who will die if it is not done. But the point, I think, is that the 
wrong move was made from the start. Surely you do have a right 
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that people will not break into your freezer and take a steak. If 
you had no such right, why would I have to compensate you later 
for having done so? And surely I do have to compensate you: I 
have to pay for the damage I caused to the freezer, and I have to 
replace, or pay you for, the steak I took. 
If all you had was a right that I not wrongly or unjustly break 
into the freezer and take a steak, then I would have done nothing 
at all you have a right I not do; in which case, why would I owe 
you anything for what I did? Similarly, if all you had was a right 
that I not break into the freezer and take a steak when I do not 
have a starving child to feed, then since I did have a starving child 
to feed, I would have done nothing at all you had a right I not do; 
so once again, no compensation would be O"iving. The fact that 
compensation is owing shows (and it seems to me, shows conclu-
sively) that I did do something you had a right that I not do. How 
are we to square this fact with the fact that I did not act wrongly 
or unjustly in doing so? I think we had better allow that there are 
cases in which a right may be infringed without being violated-i.e., 
cases in which one does a thing another has a right he not do, and 
yet in which one does not violate a right. 
Now I do not suppose that if Victim kills Aggressor in the cir-
cumstances I described at the outset, then Victim must pay com-
pensation to Aggressor's heirs. I do not suppose that if the trolley-
driver turns off to the right, killing the one, then he must pay 
compensation to the one's heirs. But there surely are cases in which 
it is permissible to kill, and in which compensation is owed. If you 
are an "innocent threat"8 to my life ( you threaten it through no 
fault of your own), and I can save my life only by killing you, and 
therefore do kill you, I think I do owe compensation, for I take your 
life to save mine. If so, I infringe a right of yours but do not violate 
it. And this means that at least some rights in respect of life-as 
well as at least some rights in respect of property-are not absolute. 
It could, of course, be insisted that Victim (supposing he killed 
Aggressor) not only violated no right of Aggressor's, but also in-
fringed no right of Aggressor's. And as I said, there is no need for 
Victim to compensate Aggressor's heirs, so there is not available 
that ground for saying that Victim infringed a right of Aggressor's. 
On the other hand, if we do say that Victim infringed a right of 
Aggressor's (and that the trolley-driver infringed a right of the one 
• The term is Robert Nozick's: d. op. cit., p. !14. 
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on the right-hand track, and ... ), then it is open to us to say-what 
had certainly seemed plausible at the outset-that we all of us do 
have a right to not be killed. Quite simply: a right to not be 
killed. Not an absolute right to not be killed, of course, only a non-
absolute right to not be killed. And saying this would be entirely 
consistent with saying that we also have the (absolute) right to not 
be killed wrongly or unjustly, which the moral specifier attributes 
to us, and the (absolute) right to not be killed if (a) we are not a 
villain who is trying to kill a person, and (b) we are not a schizo-
phrenic who ... , which the factual specifier will attribute to us if 
and when he ever finishes specifying it. 
It is not surprising that people are inclined to opt for the view 
that rights are absolute: if a person has a T'ight to such and such 
how can it be that anyone may, permissibly, deprive him of it? 
Isn't a right something one can positively demand accordance with? 
But the fact is that there are occasions on which a right is infringed 
but not violated; and a moral philosopher has to find some way of 
explaining what makes this be the case when it is. A move which 
is familiar enough is to say that what makes this be the case when it 
is is the fact that the right in question is 'over-ridden.' It is a natural 
idea, then, that we should make the same move in respect of Victim 
and Aggressor. This brings us to the third of the three replies to 
the question I asked: for obvious reasons, I will call it "over-
riding.'' 
4. An over-rider begins as follows. "Yes, Aggressor does, like 
the rest of us, have a right to not be killed. A non-absolute right is 
all it is, however. And the reason why it is permissible for Victim 
to kill Aggressor is the fact that, the circumstances being what they 
are, Aggressor's right to not be killed is over-ridden.'' But what 
does "His right is over-ridden" mean? If it means only "It is per· 
missible to infringe his right," then-so far as explanatory force is 
concerned-the over-rider might as well have instead said "And 
the reason why it is permissible for Victim to kill Aggressor is the 
fact that, the circumstances being what they are, it is permissible 
for Victim to kill Aggressor." 
Moreover, by what is Aggressor's right supposed to be over-
ridden? That is (as I take it), what is it in the circumstances such 
that, that thing being in the circumstances, it is permissible for 
Victim to kill Aggressor? An over-rider may be expected to answer 
in one or another of two ways. He may say "Aggressor's right to 
not be killed is over-ridden by the fact that a great lot o£ utility will 
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get produced if Victim kills Aggressor-much more utility than if 
Victim does not kill Aggressor." Or he may instead say "Aggressor's 
right to not be killed is over-ridden by a more stringent right of 
Victim's." I find the first of these two answers uninteresting: it is 
easy enough to add details to the story which, prima facie, at any 
rate, suggest that the utilities are not as the answer claims they are, 
and I think that a dispute as to whether or not they really do is not 
theoretically fruitful. So I shall attend only to the second of the 
two answers. 
The answer obviously invites a question: "What makes one 
right be 'more stringent than' another?" 1£ what makes Victim's 
right (whatever it is) be more stringent than Aggressor's right to 
not be killed is merely the very fact that it is permissible for Victim 
to kill Aggressor, then it is hard to see how we can explain the fact 
that it is permissible for Victim to kill Aggressor by appeal to a 
right in Victim which is more stringent than Aggressor's right to 
not be killed. I do not say that no independent account of relative 
'stringency' among rights can be given; I say only that an over-rider 
plainly needs one. 
Moreover, there is a second question which the answer invites, 
and which we should take note of, namely the question "What right 
is it which Victim has, and which is more stringent than Aggressor's 
right to not be killed, and which is such that, the circumstances 
containing the fact that that right of Victim's is more stringent than 
Aggressor's right to not be killed, it is permissible for Victim to kill 
Aggressor?" It is a good question, I think. 
We might begin with this: the right which Victim has, and 
which meets those further conditions, is the right to preserve his 
life. But is Victim's right to preserve his life more stringent than 
Aggressor's right to not be killed? Certainly it just is not the case, 
quite generally, that one person's right to preserve his life is more 
stringent than another person's right to not be killed. Suppose I 
am starving, and need food or else I die. Suppose further that the 
only available food is you. I should imagine I do have a right to 
preserve my life; but surely your right to not be killed is more 
stringent than my right to preserve my life-surely it is not per-
missible for me to kill you to preserve my life I 
Well, perhaps we simply fastened on the wrong right; perhaps 
we should instead have said that the right which Victim has, and 
which meets those further conditions, is the right to self-defense-
more precisely, perhaps, the right to preserve his life against an 
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attack on it. (Your being the only available food does not make it 
be the case that you are attacking me.) But is Victim's right to 
preserve his life against an attack on it more stringent than Aggres-
sor's right to not be killed? Certainly it just is not the case, quite 
generally, that one person's right to preserve his life against an at-
tack on it is more stringent than another person's right to not be 
killed. Suppose I am being threatened with a gun, and the only 
way in which I can preserve my life against that attack on it is by 
grabbing some innocent bystander and shoving him in front of me. 
I should imagine I do have a right to preserve my life against an 
attack on it; but surely the innocent bystander's right to not be 
killed is more stringent than my right to preserve my life against an 
attack on it-surely it is not permissible for me to shove the in-
nocent bystander in front of mel 
I suppose it could be said that Aggressor's right to not be killed 
is less stringent than yours is, and than the innocent bystander's is, 
and that that is why Victim may act though I may not. Aggressor 
is a villain, after all, and neither you nor the innocent bystander is. 
But then are we to suppose that after the stall of the tank, and 
Aggressor's breaking of his ankles, Aggressor's right to not be 
killed sweeps back to being just as stringent as yours is, and as the 
innocent bystander's is? For after that time, Victim may not kill 
Aggressor on any weaker grounds than would permit of his killing 
you or an innocent bystander. 
The right to not be killed (as well as the right to preserve one's 
life, the right to preserve one's life against an attack on it, and the 
right to life itself) is traditionally thought to be a 'natural right,' i.e., 
a right a human being has simply by virtue of being a human being.o 
Now if a right is a right which we have simply by virtue of being 
human beings, it is not possible that some human beings possess it 
and others do not. Moreover, it is not possible that a human being 
possesses it at one time and not at another, so long as he remains a 
human being throughout. 
Suppose the time now is after the start of Aggressor's attack on 
Victim, but before the time at which Aggressor ceases to pose a 
threat to Victim. If the right to not be killed is a natural right, so 
• Cp. H. L. A. Hart's definition of "natural right" in "Are There Any Natural 
Rights?," T/1e Pllilosophical Review 64 (1955). Cp. also Joel Feinberg's definition 
of what he calls "human rights" in Social Pllilosophy (Englewood Cliffs, New 
Jersey: Prcnlicc-Hall, Inc., 1973). 
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defined (henceforth I shall take this qualification to be under-
stood), then we plainly cannot say 
(I) Aggressor had (before launching his attack) and will 
again have (after breaking his ankles) a right to not 
be killed, but he does not have this right now. That 
is why Victim may now kill him .. 
But is the right to not be killed a natural right? It is by no 
means obvious that it is. Perhaps the right to not be killed is for-
feitable. Hobbes thought that the right to not be killed is inalien-
able, but perhaps even this is wrong. Could one not voluntarily re-
linquish one's right to not be killed? Suppose I am terminally ill, 
and want to be able to provide for my children. Here is a rich 
man, who likes to kill. I say "For so and so much, to be given to 
my children, you may kill me now." Suppose, then, that he ac-
cepts my offer, and kills me. No doubt he does not act well. Perhaps 
he does what it is impermissible for him to do. But I think it 
arguable that he violates-even that he infringes-no right of mine, 
and that if he does act impermissibly, it is nothing to do with my 
rights that makes this so. 
Moreover, even if the right to not be killed is a natural right, 
this docs not settle what we are to say about the case in hand. Of 
course we may not say (I). I should imagine also that we cannot say 
(2) Aggressor has (at all times) a right to not be killed, 
but Aggressor's right to not be killed is (at all times) 
less stringent than any innocent person's is-so much 
less stringent as to be less stringent than Victim's 
right to preserve his life against an attack on it. That 
is why Victim may now kill him. 
It is not inconsistent to suppose that a certain right is a right which 
we all have by virtue of being human beings, and nevertheless that 
it varies in stringency between human beings-in particular, be-
tween the innocent and the villains. We do of course say about 
natural rights that they arc 'equal' in both of the following two 
senses: every human being has them, and no one human being's are 
any more stringent than any other human being's. But only the 
first follows from the definition of "natural right" which I gave 
above. So taking the right to not be killed to be a natural right does 
not rule out opting for (2). But I take it that what I drew attention 
to a moment ago does rule out opting for (2). What I have in mind 
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is the fact that after the stall of the tank, and Aggressor's breaking 
of his ankles, Aggressor's right to not be killed is surely just as 
stringent as yours is, and as the innocent bystander's is-for after 
that time, Victim may not kill Aggressor on any weaker grounds 
than would permit of his killing you or an innocent bystander. 
This points, however, to a further possibility. It is not incon-
sistent to suppose that a certain right is a right which we all have 
by virtue of being human beings, and nevertheless that it sweeps 
back and forth from one degree of stringency to another in one 
human being-according as he is or is not threatening another. I 
do not think it is as commonly said that natural rights are also 
'equal' in the following (third) sense: no one human being's are 
any more stringent at one time than they are at any other time. 
That they are 'equal' in this sense certainly does not follow from 
the definition of "natural right" I gave, or even from their being 
'equal' in either of the two senses I pointed to. So it would be con-
sistent to say that the right to not be killed is a natural right, and 
yet also opt for 
(3) Aggressor has (at all times) a right to not be killed, 
and Aggressor's right to not be killed was (before 
launching his attack) and will again be (after break-
ing his ankles) as stringent as any innocent person's is, 
but it is less stringent now-so much less stringent 
now as to be less stringent than Victim's right to pre-
serve his life against an attack on it. That is why 
Victim may now kill him. 
So far as I can see, nothing in the case rules this out. 
But there is plainly yet another alternative. Don't we all of us 
have a right to kill a person who is currently giving us every reason 
to believe that he will kill us unless we kill him? And isn't this 
right as good a candidate for the status o£ 'natural right' as the right 
to not be killed is? And isn't it, moreover, always more stringent 
than the right to not be killed? If so, there is a fourth alternative: 
(4) Aggressor has (at all times) an equally stringent right 
to not be killed, but that right is (always) less stringent 
than the right-possessed by Victim-to kill a person 
who is currently giving every reason to believe that he 
will kill Victim unless Victim kills him. That is 
why Victim may now kill him. 
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Is there any principled ground for choosing between (3) and (4)? 
Indeed, between (I), (3), and (4)?-since, as I said, it is by no 
means obvious that the right to not be killed is a natural right. 
The other side of the same coin is that (1), (3), and (4) are 
marvelously ad hoc. Consider the appeal in (1) to loss of, and 
then re-acquisition of, the right to not be killed; is there any reason 
to opt for (I) other than the fact that if we do, we seem to have 
in hand an explanation of why Victim may kill Aggressor? Similarly 
for the appeal in (3) to difference in stringency in one person across 
time. And what of that right to kill a person who is currently giving 
every reason to believe that he will kill you unless you kill him? 
Can there he any reason to suppose we have such a right other than 
the fact that it is permissible for a victim to kill an aggressor who 
is currently giving every reason to believe that he will kill the 
victim unless the victim kills him? Notice how carefully tailored 
to its explantory purpose this right is. 
Notice, moreover, how difficult it would be to find a lesson in 
any of this in respect of permitted killings generally. Take the case 
of the trolley driver I mentioned earlier. Surely the trolley driver 
may turn his trolley, to save five at a cost of one. Does it seem at 
all plausible to say that the reason why he may is that the one has 
ceased to have a right to not be killed, or that his right to not be 
killed is now less stringent than it was before he started work on 
that particular stretch of track? Of course we could say that the 
reason why the trolley driver may turn the trolley is that he has a 
right to turn his trolley onto one to save five, and that that right is 
always more stringent than the right to not be killed-cp. (4) 
above. But you might as well say: Leave me alone, I'm too busy 
to do moral philosophy this afternoon. 
5. Many people who do moral philosophy these days appeal to 
rights to explain why this or that piece of behavior is or is not 
permissible. For example, it is common to say that the reason why 
you cannot maximize utility in such and such a case is the fact that 
the utility-maximizing course of action would involve infringing 
a right-indeed, violating a right, since the right in question is a 
stringent one, and the utility to be got not sufficiently great to 
over-ride the right. But when we say that, in that case, the utility-
maximizing course of action would involve violating a right, are 
we saying anything more than that, in that case, it is not permissible 
to take the utility-maximizing course of action? I£ not, then we can 
hardly take ourselves to have explained why it is not permissible, 
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in that case, to take the utility-maximizing course of action. It is 
arguable that if there is to be any point at <til in appealing to rights 
in such discussions, there had better be something independent of 
permissibilities and impermissibilities which fixes their existence 
and degree of stringency. It is not obvious that this is true. I.e., it 
might be that to attribute a right is only to talk about permissibili-
ties and impermissibilities, but in a way that groups or collects 
them, and brings whole clusters of cases to bear on each other. I 
do not for a moment think it a novel idea that we stand in need of 
an account of just how an appeal to a right may be thought to 
function in ethical discussion. What strikes me as of interest, how-
ever, is that the need for such an account shows itself even in a 
case which might have been thought to be transparent. 
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The E. H. Lindley Memorial Lectureship Fund was established in 
1941 in memory of Ernest H. Lindley, Chance!Jor of the University of 
Kansas from 1920 to 1939. In February 1941 Mr. Roy Roberts, the chair· 
man of the committee in charge, suggested in the Graduate Magazine that 
the Chancellor should invite to the University for a lecture or a 
series of lectures, some outstanding national or world figure to 
speak on "Values of Living"-just as the late Chancellor proposed 
to do in his courses "The Human Situation" and "Plan for 
Living." 
In the following June Mr. Roberts circulated a letter on behaU of the 
Committee, proposing in somewhat broader terms that 
The income (rom this fund should be spent in a quest of social 
betterment by bringing to the University each year outstanding 
world leaders for a lecture or series of lectures, yet with a design 
so broad in its outline that in the years to come, if it is deemed 
wise, this living memorial could take some more desirable form. 
The fund was aUowed to accumulate until 1954, when Professor Rich-
ard McKeon lectured on "Human Rights and International Relations." 
The next lec.ture was given in 1959 by Professor Everett C. Hughes, and 
has been published by the University of Kansas School of Law as part of 
his book Students' Culture and Perspectives: LecttLres on Medical and 
General Education. The selection of lecturers for the Lindley series has 
since been delegated to the Department of Philosophy. The following 
lectures have been published in individual pamphlet form and may be 
obtained from the Depanment at a price of seventy-five cents each. 
•1961. "The Idea of Man-An Outline of Philosophical Anthropology." 
Uy Jos~ Fcrrater Mora, Professor of l'hilosophy. Bryn Mawr College. 
1962. "Chan§es in £vents and Chnngcs in Things." 
Dy A. N. Prior. Professor of Philo~ophy, Universil)' of :.lanchcster. 
• t i96S. "Mol'al Philosophy nnd ~he Analysis of Language." 
lly Richard B. Brandt, ProfcS$0r of Philosophy, Sw:orthmorc College. 
•ti964. "Human Freedom and U1c Self." 
By Roderick M. Chisholm, Professor of Philosophy. Drown University. 
t l965. "Freedom of Mind'' 
By Stuart Hampshire, Professor of Philosophy. Princeton University. 
•tl966. "Some Beliefs about justice." 
By William K. Frnnl:ena, Professor of Philosophy, University of :.licbigan. 
t l967. "Form and Content in Ethical Theory." 
By Wi lfrid Sellars, Professor of Philosophy. University of Pittsburgh. 
tl968. "The Systematic Unity of Value." 
Dy J. N. Findlay, Clark Professor of Philosophy, Yale University. 
1969. "Uubcr and Bubedsm-A Crltic:ol Evaluation." 
By Paul Edwards, Pro£c$$or of Philosophy, Brooklyn College of the City Univer· 
sity of New York. 
1971. "Whnt Actl1.111y Happened.'' 
By P. H. Newell -Smith, Professor of Philosophy, York University. 
fl972. "Moral Rationality." 
.By Alan Gewirth. Professor of Philosophy, Univenity of Chicago. 
t l97S. "Renections on Evil.'' 
Dy Alben Hofstadter, Professor of Philosophy, Universi ty of Califontia, Santa 
Crut. 
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